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CONFLICT OF LAWS TREATMENT OF WARRANTIES
AND REPRESENTATIONS IN LIFE INSURANCE
POLICIES-PART ONE*
WENDELL CARNAHANt
Problems presented by warranties and representations bulk
large in the law of insurance and numerous difficulties have been
encountered. Those provisions in the specialized contract of life
insurance have resulted in the development of various techniques
for dealing with them in what may be styled a general or in-
ternal law case. By those terms is meant a non-conflict of laws
situation-one in which interstate factors which might give rise
to application of choice-of-laws rules are either non-existent or
are ignored by the courts in their opinions dealing with concrete
facts. By a conflict of laws case is meant one wherein the opinion
recognizes and discusses the interstate relationships which re-
quire judicial application of conflict of laws rules; through con-
flict of laws rules a court selects for enforcement the general
or internal law rule of the state having dominant contacts with
the operative facts of the case. In a conflict of laws situation
a court is confronted with probable variances among the internal
law rules of the states from which a conflict of laws choice is
to be made; it is also faced with variances in the conflict of laws
techniques by which the ultimate reference to the internal law
rule of one of the states is to be achieved. The situation has
become additionally complex because of the fact that numerous
states have enacted statutes whose terms cover part-but only
a part-of the internal and conflict of laws problems which may
be presented.
In developing rules to govern warranties and representations
in conflict of laws cases raised by specialized life insurance poli-
cies, the courts have expressed themselves in the traditional con-
flict of laws terminology applicable to contracts in general. Sev-
eral of these terms may be mentioned: the delivery and place of
delivery of the contract; the place of making of the contract;
* This paper forms the basis of a chapter in a forthcoming book on
CONFLICT OF LAWS AND LIFE INSURANcE CONTRACTS. All rights are reserved.
t Professor of Law, Washington University.
Washington University Open Scholarship
CONFLICTS TREATMENT OF WARRANTIES
the place of performance of the contract; and the place whose
law the parties intended to govern the contract. In life insur-
ance cases, at least, the opinions have frequently overlooked the
fact that each of these terms is one of multiple meanings; an
unnoticed shift in connotations may result in two conflict of laws
cases selecting internal law rules leading to diametrically oppo-
site results. Further, courts do not consistently apply any single
rule-such as the "place of making rule"-to decide all types of
conflict of laws problems raised by life insurance policies. Al-
though present space limitations preclude consideration of the
different meanings with which courts have used general phrases
for the selection of particular contracts rules to govern different
conflict of laws issues, it is the purpose of this article to present
a number of conflict of laws problems arising out of warranties
and representations in life insurance policies.
This paper consists of three main divisions. As conflict of
laws cases reflect and are somewhat conditioned by the rules
regarding representations and warranties which obtain in vari-
ous states, it is useful to review briefly the development of com-
mon law principles of general insurance law applicable to this
phase of insurance problems. Statutes which substantially change
earlier common law rules now exist in the majority of states.
As these statutes play an important role in both internal law
and conflict of laws cases, it is necessary to outline the scope of
current legislation. This background is furnished in the first
main division.
The second division deals with the conflict of laws cases in
which questions of warranties and representations have been
raised. In view of the insurance background indicated in the
first part, the second division includes a preliminary evaluation
of the factors which underlie the opinions in a very confused
branch of the law and the cases are considered in relation to the
three rules which govern contracts in the conflict of laws-the
rules of the place of making, of the place of performance, and
of the intention of the parties.
The third major division, which will appear in the following
issue of this law quarterly, continues the examination of conflict
of laws cases advanced in the second division but places emphasis
upon certain special types of problems.
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I. GENERAL INSURANCE RULES
The principles of warranties and representations in the gen-
eral law of insurance have had an unusual development. These
principles were introduced by Lord Mansfield into the body of
the common law at a relatively late date, and the rules were
originally designed to afford protection to underwriters who
might otherwise have been at the mercy of unscrupulous appli-
cants for insurance. In an intermediate stage of development
many courts overlooked the original purpose of these rules and
so applied them that they over-reached their legitimate object,
gave an unjustified advantage to insurers, and became a trap
for an unwary insuring public. A reaction occurred which re-
sulted in a judicial re-examination of the principles governing
problems of representations and warranties and in legislation.
The statutes which were enacted inevitably gave rise to new
problems. In various stages of growth of the legal rules govern-
ing these questions, conflict of laws problems have been presented
to the courts, and judges have necessarily reflected in their opin-
ions the internal law rules which obtained in the states with
which the facts had close connection.
The word "warranty" is one of many meanings and in insur-
ance law the term is a misnomer.1 Before its application in insur-
ance law the term "warranty" had acquired in the law of sales
the general meaning of a collateral promise by the seller, rather
than a condition to performance of the contract. But as Lord
Mansfield effected the transition of insurance from the law mer-
chant into the common law, the term took on the character of
a condition to the promise of the underwriter. Insurance at
that time was confined to marine risks; frequently the ship or
cargo which was to be insured was in distant waters and the
underwriters were necessarily forced to rely upon full and fair
disclosures by the applicant. Most of the statements made to
induce acceptance of the risk were of the utmost materiality and
declarations by the applicant which became incorporated into
the policy were termed warranties. At the same time that Lord
Mansfield was applying common law principles to problems of
insurance which had formerly been dealt with as part of the
law merchant, he was also forming that part of the law of con-
tracts which deals with conditions. This jurist had held that
1. 3 Williston, Contracts (2nd ed. 1936) §673.
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express conditions in ordinary contracts must be strictly and
literally performed; warranties in the specialized contract of
insurance were denominated conditions and strict performance
was required. It has been said that warranties were probably
introduced into the insurance contract by laymen rather than by
lawyers and were adapted to the protection of an infant indus-
try.2 However sound some of the decisions may have been when
rendered, at the present time they appear unreasonably harsh
in their requirement of strict performance.3
Along with the law of warranties Lord Mansfield developed
the law relating to representations. Representations were defined
as statements which induced the agreement but had not been
included in the written contract, and so were distinguished from
warranties. A parallel may be drawn between representations
in the insurance law and the implied-at-law conditions, also
evolved by Lord Mansfield in other branches of contract law,
as to which it was held that substantial performance constituted
sufficient basis for recovery. 4 The principle of substantial per-
formance was applied to representations in insurance, as was
also the correlative rule that immaterial misrepresentations did
not constitute a basis for avoidance of the contract by the in-
surer. As fraud was not neceessary to avoid the contract if the
misrepresentation was actually material, neither was fraud a
defense when the misrepresentation related only to an immaterial
fact.
In an intermediate stage in the development of the law of
warranties, courts applied the common law rules first established
by Lord Mansfield, and held that most provisions in policies
which imposed obligations upon the applicant or recited dis-
closures made by him constituted warranties. Under common
law rules those provisions, and there were many, were required
to be strictly performed before recovery would be permitted.
The rule was extended from marine insurance to other risk-
shifting contracts, including those of fire and life insurance.
2. Patterson, Warranties in Insurance Law (1934) 34 Colum L. Rev. 595.
& E. g., Hibbert v. Pigou (K. B. 1783) Park, Marine Insurances (3d Am.
ed. 1800) 389, 3 Doug. 224, 99 Eng. Rep. 624; Kenyon v. Berthon (K. B.
1778) 1 Doug. 12, 99 Eng. Rep. 10; De Hahn v. Hartley (K. B. 1786) 1
T. R. 343, 99 Eng. Rep. 1130.
4. E. g., Kingston v. Preston (K. B. 1773) 2 Doug. 690, 99 Eng. Rep.
487, Lofft 194, 98 Eng. Rep. 606; Boone v. Eyre (K. B. 1777) 1 H. B1.
278, 126 Eng. Rep. 160.
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Difficulties multiplied. Near the close of the nineteenth century
the phenomenal expansion of insurance in the United States
clearly revealed that those common law principles, established
when insurance was relatively infrequent and was confined to
the peculiar circumstances of marine risks, were unsuited to
changing conditions. These common law principles were first
established to protect the underwriters from undue advantage
taken by applicants. But their literal application by the courts
became the means of oppression when unprecedented expansion
of the insurance institution included new fields in its assumption
of risks, made large sections of the American public insurance
conscious, and raised many new problems as well as old problems
in great numbers of additional cases.
It has not been uncommon for courts deciding insurance ques-
tions in earlier days to point out the practice of draftsmen to
multiply warranty clauses for the benefit of the insurers. Under
the terms included in the policy the insured or his beneficiary,
because of some trivial departure, would frequently be deprived
of the value of the contract. To overcome the unfairness which
was resulting from application of recognized rules of insurance
law, several approaches developed more or less contemporane-
ously. When questions of fact were presented, juries frequently
found against the insurance company. Some courts frankly con-
strued declarations in the policy in favor of the insured whenever
there was opportunity to do so; others, not so forthright, sought
to change the apparent meaning of warranty provisions by con-
struction under the guise of an ambiguity, or to narrow the scope
of warranties by increasing that of representations. Occasion-
ally it was incorrectly said that warranties related to immaterial
points only, or that the doctrine of substantial performance ap-
plied to warranties as well as to representations. In relation to
health statements recited in life insurance policies, some courts
ruled that these disclosures were only matters of opinion. The
companies, nevertheless, had a decided advantage in their ability
to issue new forms to avoid the effect of the most recent deci-
sions. And as progress was made by liberality in the courts of
one state, it was lost by strict construction in another state.
5. This is true even in conflict of laws cases. See, e. g., Northwestern
L. Ins. Co. v. Riggs (1906) 203 U. S. 243; Pacific Mut. L. Ins. Co. of
California v. Hale (Te. Civ. App. 1924) 267 S. W. 282; Schuermann v.
Union Central L. Ins. Co. (1901) 165 Mo. 641, 65 S. W. 723.
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Methods for avoiding limitations of the strict doctrine of war-
ranties were not confined to life insurance but occurred in all
branches of insurance. Each of the devices developed to reduce
the likelihood of forfeiture because of some breach of warranty
upon an immaterial point or because of some innocent mis-
representation occurred first in the general law of insurance but
inevitably became a factor in conflict of laws cases. In short,
there was the utmost confusion. Although it was recognized that
Lord Mansfield should have held that a warranty upon an im-
material provision had no more legal effect than an immaterial
misrepresentation,6 case law was unable to cope with the situa-
tion without the aid of legislation.7
One of the greatest developments of insurance law in modern
times has been the legislative attack on the doctrine of warran-
ties. As the inadequacy of the judicial machinery to cope with
these problems was revealed, a wave of legislation manifested
public reaction to evils which were generally attributed to mach-
inations of the insurance companies, with only a few working
in the field of life insurance who recognized that the chief source
of the difficulty lay in the judicial rules themselves which operated
in an unsatisfactory way when applied to types of insurance other
than marine, and when applied in large numbers of cases. But
it is not to be taken that legislation is universal. In fourteen
states8 legislation has not generally affected the common law rules
in respect to warranties and representations. Even in those states
which still follow common law rules, uniformity does not exist
in respect to the approach to be taken to these problems. In a
few states the strict rules of warranties obtain; in others some
degree of mitigation has been achieved by the construction pro-
cess. On the other hand, in reference to misrepresentations, the
statutes of a number of states adopt an even stricter rule than
was applied under the English common law and declare that
6. Vance, The History of the Development of the Warranty in Insurance
Law (1911) 20 Yale L. J. 523, 534.
7. Patterson, Warranties in Insurance Law (1934) 34 Colum. L. Rev.
595.
8. Arkansas (but see Pope's Dig. 1937, §7850, which probably applies
only to assessment companies and reaffirms the doctrine of strict warranty) ;
Colorado; Connecticut (but, where copy of application is not furnished, see
note 20, infra); Florida; Illinois; Iowa (but see 1939 Code §8770, for
estoppel in regard to health statements); Maine; Mississippi; Montana;
New Hampshire; Oklahoma (but see Harlow's Stat. 1931, §10519 on non-
medical contracts); South Carolina (but see note 20, infra) ; Vermont; and
West Virginia.
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fraudulent misrepresentations upon immaterial points constitute
a basis for avoidance of the contract by the insurer. Neverthe-
less, it is believed that there is as yet no decision holding that
fraudulent misrepresentations upon an immaterial point consti-
tute a defense to an insurer.
In those states having statutes bearing upon these problems,
the legislative approach was not confined to a single front but
spread along various lines. Several may be mentioned.", Some
phases of the warranty-representation problem were dealt with
in statutes seeking to bring the policy and application together,
as by requiring that the policy and application shall constitute
the entire contract, or by requiring a copy of the application to
be attached to the policy. Statutes providing for incontestability
dealt with another phase of the problem. Other statutes provide
substantially as follows: "If the age of the insured has been mis-
stated, the amount payable under the policy shall be such as the
premium would have purchased at the correct age."
It was noted above that fourteen states have enacted no com-
prehensive statutes to cover the problems of warranties and
representations in life insurance. Statutes which exist in the
remaining states may be divided into eight groups in respect to
their provisions. Consideration of the internal law cases arising
under these statutes and involving their construction is not with-
in the scope of this study,' but it must be observed that the
courts of two states may differ materially in their construction
of identically worded statutes. Further, there may exist in the
same state several statutes framed without due consideration to
their interrelationship. The statutes fall into the following
groups.
I. Twenty-one states have statutes providing that in the ab-
sence of fraud statements shall be deemed representations and
not warranties.12 For purposes of comparison with current com-
9. For discussion of cases establishing the rules for the various states,
see Magaw, Representations in the Law of Life Insurance (1937) 11 Temp.
U. L. Q. 463 and (1937) 12 Temp. U. L. Q. 55-63.
10. These statutes give rise to special problems which cannot be con-
sidered in this paper and citation of the statutes here would serve no useful
purpose.
11. For consideration of cases see Magaw, Representations in the Law
of Life Insurance (1937) 12 Temp. U. L. Q. 55, 64-88, but note divergency
between his and the present grouping of statutes, notes 12-20, infra.
12. Arizona Rev. Code (Struckmeyer 1928) §1847 (see also note 20,
infra); California Ins. Code (Deering 1937) §10113; Idaho Code Ann.(Bobbs-MerriU 1932) §40-1303; Indiana Stat. Ann. (Burns 1933 with 1939
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CONFLICTS TREATMENT OF WARRANTIES
pany practices, of one hundred thirteen currently used forms
which were examined, the policies of one hundred ten companies
include this clause 13 (and it is included in the application of one
additional insurer).
II. Six states have statutes to the effect that all statements
shall be deemed representations and not warranties.4
III. Fourteen states have statutes in which there is a some-
what material overlapping.' 5
IV. Nine states have statutes to the effect that no misrepresen-
Supp.) §394206; Kansas Gen. Stat. Ann. (Corrick 1935) §40420, amended
by Laws of 1939, p. 405 (and see note 17, infra); Louisiana Gen. Stat.
(Dart 1939) §4113 (and see note 20, infra); Michigan Comp. Laws (Mason
1929 with 1935 Supp.) §12427 (and see note 16, infra); Minnesota Stat.
(Mason 1927 with 1936 Supp.) §3402 (and see notes 16, 20, infra); New
Jersey Rev. Stat. (1937) Tit. 17, c. 34, §15; New Mexico Stat. Ann. (Court-
right 1929) §71-161, amended by Laws 1941, c. 213, pp. 490, 494; New
York Consol. Laws (Cahill 1939 Supp.) c. 882, art. 7, §142 and, on rein-
statement, §143, and see also, §§149, 150; North Dakota Comp. Laws
(1913 with 1913-1925 Supp.) §6635c, amended by Laws of 1927, p. 277
and, for definitions, see §§6480-6528; Ohio Gen. Code Ann. (Page 1926)
§9420, amended by Laws of 1939, p. 679 (and see note 18, 20, infra);
Oregon Code Ann. (1930) §46-506 and, on fraternals, §46-708 (and see
note 14, infra); Pennsylvania Laws of 1937, p. 774 (and see note 19,
infra); South Dakota Comp. Laws (1929) §9340 (and see notes 19, 20,
infra); Tennessee Code (Williams, Shannon & Harsh 1932) §6179 (and
see note 16, infra); Texas Stat. (Vernon 1936) §4732 (and see notes
17, 20, infra); Utah Rev. Stat. (1933) §43-3-24; Virginia Code (Michie
1986) §4251c (and see note 14, infra) ; Washington Code Ann. (Pierce 1933)
§8128 (and see note 18, infra); Wyoming Rev. Stat. (Courtright 1931)
§57-232. And District of Columbia Code (1929 with 1939 Supp.) tit. 5, c. 7,
§220 b (3) (and see note 17, infra).
18. Such a provision in the policy, however, would not necessarily be
controlling in a conflict of laws case when the contract was made in one
of the states having a statute of some one of the succeeding types. From
the standpoint of these states, the vice of the clause would undoubtedly
consist of its purport to make fraudulent misrepresentations upon imma-
terial points the basis of avoidance by the insurance company.
14. Georgia Code (1933) §56-908 (and see also §§56-820, 56-821); Ken-
tucky Stat. Ann. (B3aldwin 1936) §639; Nebraska Comp. Stat (1929 with
1985 Supp.) §44-322 (while apparently not within this group, the Nebraska
statute is the same in effect; it provides that no misrepresentation or war-
ranty shall avoid unless it deceived the company); North Carolina Code
(Michie 1985) §6289 (and see note 20, infra); Oregon Code Ann. (1930)
§46-131 (and see note 12, supra) ; Virginia Code (Michie 1936) §4220 (and
see note 12, supra).
15. Arizona listed in notes 12 and 20; Kansas listed in notes 12 and 17;
Louisiana listed in notes 12 and 20; Minnesota listed in notes 12, 16 and
20; North Carolina listed in notes 12 and 20; North Dakota listed in notes
12 and 16; Ohio listed in notes 12, 18 and 20; Oregon listed in notes 12
and 14; Pennsylvania listed in notes 12 and 19; South Dakota listed in
notes 12 and 19; Tennessee listed in notes 12 and 16; Texas listed in notes
12, 17 and 20; Virginia listed in notes 12 and 14; Washington listed in
notes 12 and 18; Wisconsin listed in notes 16 and 19. And District of
Columbia listed in notes 12 and 17.
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tation shall defeat or avoid the policy unless such misrepresenta-
tion is made with intent to defraud or unless the matter misrep-
resented increased the risk of loss. 16
V. Four states have statutes to the effect that no misrepresen-
tations made in obtaining a policy of life insurance shall be
deemed material or render the policy void unless the matter mis-
represented shall have actually contributed to the contingency
or event upon which the policy is to become due and payable, and
whether it so contributed shall be a question for the jury.1 7
VI. Two states have statutes to the effect that no false answer
shall bar recovery unless it be willfully false, fraudulently made,
material, and induced the company to issue the policy.18
VII. Four states have statutes, either in conjunction with
others mentioned above or alone, to the effect that where the
medical examiner certifies that an applicant is a fit subject for
insurance, the company shall be estopped from asserting that
the assured was not in the condition of health required by the
policy at the time of issuance or delivery thereof, unless the same
was procured by or through the fraud or deceit of the assured."
VIII. In thirteen states other miscellaneous statutes of limited
scope have been enacted which have some bearing upon the prob-
lems of warranties and representations in relation to life insur-
ance.
20
16. Alabama Code (Michie 1928) §8364; Delaware Rev. Code (1935)
§509, amended by Laws of 1939, p. 150 and, on reinstatement see §496;
(1932) c. 175, §186, Minnesota stat. (Mason 1927 with 1936 supp.) §3370.
Maryland Ann. Code (Bagby 1924) art. 48a, §87; Massachusetts Gen. Laws
(and see notes 12 and 20); Nevada Laws 1941, Art. 5, §49, p. 482; North
Dakota Comp. Laws (1913 with 1913-1925 Supp.) §6501 (and see note 12,
supra); Tennessee Code (Williams, Shannon & Harsh 1932) §6126 (and
see note 12, supra) ; Wisconsin Stat. (1937) §209.06 (and see note 19, infra).
17. Kansas Gen. Stat. Ann. (Corrick 1935) §40-418 (and see note 12,
supra); Missouri Rev. Stat. (1939) §5843; Rhode Island Gen. Laws (Act
of April 24, 1931) c. 1757, §12; Texas Stat. (Vernon 1936) §5043 (and see
notes 12 and 20). And District of Columbia Code (1929 with 1939 Supp.)
tit. 5, c. 7, §217 m (and see note 12, supra).
18. Ohio Gen. Code Ann. (Page 1926) §9391 (and see note 20, infra);
Washington Code Ann. (Pierce 1933) §2941 (and see note 12, supra).
19. Iowa Code (1939) §8770; Pennsylvania Stat. (Purdon 1936) tit. 40,
§511a; South Dakota Comp. Laws (1929) §§9311, 9312 (and see note 12,
supra); Wisconsin Stat (1937) §209.07 (and see note 16, supra).
20. The following are in addition to statutory types indicated note 10,
supra:
Arizona Rev. Code (Struckmeyer 1928) §1849 (on non-medical and cer-
tain infants' contracts); Arkansas Digest (Pope 1937) §7850 (statements,
representations and answers on part of applicants for membership as to
questions of age, etc., shall be construed as warranties; this statute prob-
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The foregoing statement of the types of statutes directly con-
cerned with these problems indicates that there is not substantial
agreement among the states as to the best approach to these
questions. In some instances legislation has apparently conferred
upon the insurance companies additional advantages which did
not exist at common law; that some statutes treat fraudulent
immaterial misrepresentations in the same way that the common
law treated warranties is an illustration. In various cases pre-
senting problems of internal law, state courts have construed and
upheld the constitutionality of statutes enacted in their own
states to liberalize the common law rules applied to warranties.
The Supreme Court of the United States, also, has held2 1 that
statutes bearing upon representations and warranties are within
the police power of the states enacting them in respect to con-
tracts made within their borders; that Court has upheld these
statutes as constituting no violation of the privileges and immuni-
ties and the due process clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The divergencies existing among the rules of many of the states,
whether those are common law or statutory rules, constitute a
definite part of the factors in conflict of laws cases.
II. APPLICATION OF CONFLICT OF LAWS RULES - IN GENERAL
The conflict of laws cases arising under both common law and
statutory rules show that the case must be strong indeed in
which the insurance company can overcome the various protec-
tive measures which are available in favor of the insured and
ably applies only to assessment companies) ; Connecticut Gen. Stat. (1930
with 1935 Supp.) §4191 (estoppel where insurer failed to furnish copy of
application); Georgia Code (1933) §§56-820, 56-821 (representations cove-
nanted to be true); Louisiana Gen. Stat. (Dart 1939) §4118 (on non-medical
contracts); see Note, Life Insurance without Medical Examination in Louisi-
ana (1936) 10 Tul. L. Rev. 629; Minnesota Stat. (Mason 1927 with 1936
Supp.) §3396 (on non-medical and certain infants' contracts); North Caro-
lina Code (Michie 1935) §6460 (on non-medical contracts); Ohio Gen. Code
Ann. (Page 1926) §9392 and §§9387-9389 (certain estoppels); Oklahoma
Stat. (Harlow 1931 with 1936 Supp.) §10519 (on non-medical and certain
infants' contracts) and §10529 (misrepresentation in proof of death) ; South
Carolina Code (Michie 1932) §7987 (insurer may institute proceedings to
vacate policy for falsity of representations in application) ; South Dakota
Comp. Laws (1929) §9313 (when insurer may not contest); Texas Stat.
(Vernon 1936) §5046 (misrepresentations in proof of death); Washington
Code Ann. (Pierce 1933) §3129 (on non-medical and certain infants' con-
tracts).
21. Northwestern L. Ins. Co. v. Riggs (1906) 203 U. S. 243; John Han-
cock Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. Warren (1901) 181 U. S. 73; Continental L. Ins.
Co. v. Chamberlain (1889) 132 U. S. 304.
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his beneficiaries. As the problems presented by warranties and
representations in both internal and conflict of laws cases have
been especially acute, the confusion in the conflict of laws cases
is particularly marked. The following pages deal with the oper-
ation of various principles in conflict of laws cases, but certain
considerations should first be made explicit.
Three principles which run throughout conflict of laws cases
in insurance are clearly marked in those dealing with warranties
and representations. First, the law of life insurance-repre-
sented by both internal and conflict of laws cases-has been char-
acterized by the large number of decisions against insurance
carriers. Second, several conflict of laws rules applicable to con-
tracts are available and the courts of no state have been entirely
consistent in following any single rule. And, third, most courts
for most purposes follow the rule of the place of making of the
contract.
The rule of the place of making has its foundation upon the
fundamental policy, which every state reflects to a large extent,
of using its own general rules to protect its own residents who
enter into contracts within its borders. It appears that in most
of the reported conflict of laws cases involving problems of war-
ranties and representations the policy was issued to a resident
of the forum or, in a few instances, to a resident of some third
state other than that of incorporation of the insurance company.
In these cases resort to the common or statutory law of the place
of residence of the insured has usually been sufficient to ground
recovery against the carrier. Since the concept of "delivery '22
can be used to define "the last act necessary to complete the con-
tract" as being equivalent to manual receipt of the document by
the applicant, and to connect the policy with the applicant's
home-state as "the place of making" of the contract, that conno-
tation of "delivery" has most frequently been accepted by courts
for resolving problems of representations and warranties.
In some instances, however, the selection of a choice-of-laws
rule in the manner indicated above would result in application
of a law which was less favorable to the claimant than if some
other basis of selection had been utilized. This will occur in those
22. See Carnahan, The Delivery of a Life Insurance Policy: Function
and Scope of the Delivery Concept for Conflict of Laws Purposes (1941)
26 Minnesota L. Rev. 50.
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instances where the rule obtaining at the insurer's home-state
is more favorable to the claimant. In such situations it has not
been uncommon for courts to select the rule of the insurer's
home-state and the reference has been indicated in several dif-
ferent ways. These cases introduce an element of uncertainty.
One possibility is for the court to reject the connotation of de-
livery which relates to the manual receipt of the policy by the
applicant and to find that the contract was "made" at the time
some significant act occurred at the insurer's home-office. In
these relatively few instances the place of making rule consti-
tutes the basis upon which the decision rests but the principle
is applied in an unusual way because of change in content of the
words "delivery" or "last necessary act."
Occasionally a statute favorable to the claimant may obtain
in the insurer's home-state, and a court may apply that legisla-
tion on the ground that "Everywhere, within and without the
state which created it, its contracts are limited, construed and
sustained according to its charter and the laws which affect its
operation." 23 There is also a tendency to refer to rules obtaining
at the insurer's home-state in cases presented by certificates of
fraternal associations.2 4
Another basis upon which a court may select rules obtaining
in the state where the insurance company is incorporated is use
of the rule that problems raised by an insurance policy are to
be governed by the law of the place where the contract was to
be performed; emphasis upon certain aspects of performance
may connect those factors with the insurer's home-state and the
law of that place is used to determine all questions before the
forum court, whether they relate to performance or not.
A third principle which is available to a court as a basis for
selecting rules obtaining in the insurer's home-state is the test
of the intention of the parties. It was formerly quite common
to insert a clause in a life insurance policy providing that it was
made under and to be construed solely by the rules obtaining at
the insurer's home-office. As the intention rule has been applied
in cases dealing with warranties and representations, it has
23. Fidelity Mut. L. Ass'n v. Ficklin (1891) 74 Md. 172, 21 Atl. 680.
This doctrine was quoted with approval and applied in Fidelity Mut. L.
Assoc. v. McDaniel (1900) 25 Ind. App. 608, 57 N. E. 645, although it was
ultimately held that the misrepresentations were material.
24. These cases are considered in the concluding division of this paper.
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largely centered upon provisions of this tenor. Some courts have
dealt with these clauses in a different manner and have refused
to effectuate provisions of that kind; usually the reason was that
the law of the place of manual receipt of the policy by the appli-
cant was more favorable to the claimant. In dealing with the
cases of the latter group a problem of classification arises. In
one sense they constitute a phase of the intention test; in an-
other sense, because the court has refused to apply the intention
test, these cases may be classified as applications of the rule of
the place of making. It is more useful that the two groups of
cases, both dealing with the same type of provision, should be
considered in relation to each other than that one be treated with
other cases applying the place of making rule, and they are so
presented at a later point.
Principles outlined above underlie the conflict of laws cases
dealing with the specialized problems of warranties and repre-
sentations although, in comparison with other aspects of insur-
ance law, they are frequently applied in an unusual way. Cases
have been found adopting a wide variety of approaches, and the
decisions are presented in the following pages. The shifting
emphasis by courts upon various factors will be more clearly
followed if some conclusions are here indicated.
The mere examination of a large number of conflict of laws
cases dealing with warranties and representations, without class-
ifying the decisions, suggests that the general rules applicable to
these problems have been regarded as alternatives and that
courts have made use of whichever principle would sustain re-
covery against an insurer. Indeed, in six jurisdictions the judi-
cial opinions dealing only with misrepresentations and warran-
ties, and hence not showing additional possible differences in
other phases of insurance problems, have stated inconsistent
rules.25 It is useful, however, in approaching conflict of laws
cases dealing with representations and warranties to remember
the peculiar development of these doctrines in common and stat-
utory law, to bear in mind the unusually severe consequences
from trivial breaches of those rules which frequently occurred,
and to recall the reaction which was directed against the appli-
cation of formerly accepted principles. An examination of even
25. These cases are indicated in the concluding division of this paper,
note 138, infra.
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current statutes shows that uniformity does not exist and that
states differ in the extent to which potential misapplication of
common law rules has been eliminated. In the light of those con-
siderations, the conflict of law cases dealing with these problems
would be unusual indeed if they did not reflect the lack of uni-
formity existing in the judicial and statutory rules of the various
states.
The emphasis which has been placed by various writers upon
the fact that most courts, for most purposes, adopt the rule of
the place of making should not be allowed .to obscure the fact
that a number of courts generally follow the rule of the place
of performance and others follow the intention test with some
degree of consistency. Perhaps part of the apparent confusion
would be avoided if it were known that some of the courts which
adopt the rules of the place of performance and intention of the
parties in warranty and representation cases were but consis-
tently following the same rules which they applied in other prob-
lems involving contracts. The reference above to the incon-
sistency obtaining in six different jurisdictions indicates that
the suggestion just made would not resolve all difficulties.
As to the remainder of the cases, it is believed that the courts
which generally follow the place of making rule approach prob-
lems of warranties and representations with the view that there
is a strong presumption that the place of making rule is the
proper one to follow and that "the place of making" is the state
wherein the policy came into the manual control of the insured.
But in instances where application of that rule would be less
favorable to the claimant than the rule obtaining at the home-
state of the insurance company, the court may apply the law
of the latter place. The circumstances that the policy provided
that it was made there, or that it was to be governed by the laws
of that place, or that it was to be performed there, may be given
effect. That effect may be expressed by saying that "the contract
was made there," using some connotation of delivery other than
that of manual receipt; or by saying that "the contract was to
be performed there," with or without specification of the element
of performance which is controlling in the particular case; or
by saying that "the parties intended" that law to apply. In war-
ranty and representation cases a conflict of laws reference to the
law of only two states is available-that of the insurer's home-
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office or that of some other state taken as the place of making
of the contract. That is, instead of an indiscriminate reference
to any law which will sustain the contract and an indiscriminate
employment of any available rule, there is strong likelihood that
those courts which generally adopt the place of making rule will
continue to utilize it in explaining the decision in a warranty or
representation case; latitude exists only in instances where the
law of the insurer's home-state is more favorable to the claim-
ant, furnishing a basis for the judicial belief that the place of
making rule is, in that case, an improper choice-of-laws rule or
that a shift from the usual connotation of "making" is justifiable.
Substantially the same idea is expressed, although in an indefi-
nite form, by courts which state that the parties are presumed
to contract with reference to the lex locus contractus, but, where
the contract specifies that it shall be governed by the law of the
place of performance, that law will be applied insofar as it does
not conflict with rules of policy of the forum.20 Whether the
selection of the insurer's home-state, as the one permissible state
other than the place of making, is expressed in the opinion in
terminology of performance or intention of the parties is im-
material. But if common law or statutory rules of the place of
making are more favorable to the claimant then, it seems, that
is determinative indication of public policy against application
of any other test.
Inconsistency exists only if a premise be taken that all con-
flict of laws questions are and should be decided by one single
rule; inconsistency ceases when it is recognized that courts em-
ploy various rules to solve entirely different problems. The pecu-
liar problems raised by divergent principles operating in differ-
ent states to govern warranties and representations have called
for modification of generally accepted techniques in conflict of
laws cases. The balance of this main division considers the con-
flict of laws cases from the standpoint of the three generally ac-
cepted rules governing contracts in the conflict of laws-the rules
26. "Parties are presumed to contract with reference to the place of the
contract. If it is valid there, it is valid everywhere. * * * where a contract
is made in one state to be perforimed in another, the laws of the latter
state govern as to the validity, nature, obligation, and construction of the
contract * * *; and they will be enforced by comity, unless contrary to our
statute law, our general public policy, or violative of the conscience of the
State called on to give it effect." Russell, J., in Missouri State L. Ins. Co. v.
Lovelace (1907) 1 Ga. App. 446, 465, 58 S. E. 93, 102.
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of the place of making, the place of performance, and the law
intended by the parties to govern the contract.
1. The factor of the place of maling.
Since the internal common law and statutory rules of the place
where the applicant resided at the time the insurance policy was
issued have usually been most favorable to him, courts have gen-
erally applied the law of that place; since manual receipt of the
policy usually occurred at the place of the applicant's residence,
the delivery concept has generally been employed with that con-
notation in cases presenting problems of warranties and repre-
sentations. This has been true whether the forum was the place
where the application was made or whether manual receipt of
the document occurred while the applicant was resident in an-
other state; the cases dealing with the latter type of situation
will be considered near the close of this subdivision.
Although a number of cases mention the circumstance of resi-
dence of the applicant within the state where the policy was
physically received by him, the opinions do not generally make
clear that the courts have considered the factor of residence to
be a dominant one for the purposes of allowing recovery; that
is left to inference. One characteristic of many opinions is a
failure to point out the localization of some of the potentially
important factors, such as the residence of the applicant, the
place where the policy was delivered, and the place where the
insurer was incorporated. These opinions do not make for clarity
of the rule or rules applied.-
It has been indicated above that the phrase "place of making"
is susceptible of various meanings which may lead to inconsistent
results. The connotation of the place of making rule as being
the place where the last act was done which was necessary to
complete the transaction and bind both parties to it has been
utilized in a number of conflict of laws cases to localize the in-
surance contract and to indicate the law governing problems of
representations and warranties.28 But as the phrase "place of
27. See, e. g., Chamberlain v. National L. & Accid. Ins. Co. (1934) 256
Ky. 548, 76 S. W. (2d) 628.
28. Bukowski v. Security Ben. Ass'n (1935) 221 Iowa 416, 261 N. W.
788; Limbaugh v. Monarch L. Ins. Co. (Mo. App. 1935) 84 S. W. (2d)
208; Hare & Chase, Inc. v. National Surety Co. (D. C. S. D. N. Y. 1931)
49 F. (2d) 447 (surety bond but "a bond that guarantees against losses
is construed as a policy of insurance," id. at 453) ; Lincoln Nat. L. Ins. Co. v.
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making" is indefinite, so also no single device has been employed
in indicating what constitutes the "final act"; frequently the
latter is related to "delivery" but it, also, has numerous conno-
tations. The representation and warranty cases reflect this treat-
ment. Opinions expressing localization of the contract for the
purpose of dealing with these problems usually employ very gen-
eral phrases which are themselves mere conclusions. Thus there
are found in the opinions such clauses as the following: "The
policy was issued and delivered"; "the policy was delivered and
the premiums paid"; "the insurance contract was negotiated, the
premiums paid and the policy delivered"-to which may be added
"where the insured resided," etc.29 Emphasis upon payment of
Hammer (C. C. A. 8th 1930) 41 F. (2d) 12; Metropolitan L. Ins. Co. v.
Cohen (C. C. A. 2d 1938) 96 F. (2d) 66.
29. Mutual Ben. L. Ins. Co. v. Robison (C. C. N. D. Iowa E. D. 1893)
54 Fed. 580, affirmed (C. C. A. 8th 1893) 58 Fed. 723 (delivery and pay-
ment of premium); New York L. Ins. Co. v. Russell (C. C. A. 8th 1896)
77 Fed. 94 (application made, policy delivered and premiums paid); Provi-
dent Say. L. Assur. Soc. v. Hadley (C. C. A. 1st 1900) 102 Feb. 866,
affirming (C. C. D. Mass. 1898) 90 Fed. 390 (approval, acceptance and
payment); Fidelity Mut. L. Ass'n v. Jeffords (C. C. A. 5th 1901) 107 Fed.
402 (contract of insurance made, delivered and premiums paid where in-
sured resided); Great Southern L. Ins. Co. v. Burwell (C. C. A. 5th 1926)
12 F. (2d) 244, cert. den. (1926) 271 U. S. 683 (solicited and delivered
policy in the state * * * and is licensed to do business in the state) ; New
York L. Ins. Co. v. Webber (C. C. A. 1st 1932) 60 F. (2d) 22, cert. den.(1932) 287 U. S. 662 (application taken in this state provided that insur-
ance was not to take effect until delivery which occurred in this state);
Fountain & Herrington v. Mutual L. Ins. Co. of N. Y. (C. C. A. 4th 1932)
55 F. (2d) 120 (policy delivered and premiums paid); Palmquist v. Stan-
dard Accid. Ins. Co. (D. C. S. D. Cal. N. D. 1933) 3 F. Supp. 358 (policy
applied for, delivered and premiums paid); Mutual Trust L. Ins. Co. v.
Ossen (C. C. A. 2d 1935) 77 F. (2d) 317, cert. den. (1935) 296 U. S. 616
(delivery and payment of premium); New York L. Ins. Co. v. Malloy
(D. C. N. H. 1938)- 21 F. Supp. 1001 (application made, first premium
paid and policy delivered); New York L. Ins. Co. v. Levin (C. C. A. 8th
1939) 102 F. (2d) 403 (policy was applied for and was delivered); John
Hancock Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. Ramey (1940) 200 Ark. 635, 140 S. W. (2d)
701 (policy issued and delivered to a resident of a foreign state-but in-
surer failed to satisfy rules of evidence of forum); New York L. Ins. Co. v.
Rigas (1933) 117 Conn. 437, 168 AtI. 22 (issued to a resident of the state
and it is presumed was accepted by him there); Chamberlain v. National
L. & Accid. Ins. Co. (1934) 256 Ky. 548, 76 S. W. (2d) 628 (policy issued
and delivered); Mutual L. Ins. Co. v. Mullan (1908) 107 Md. 457, 69 Atl.
385 (delivery and payment of premium); Dolan v. Mutual Res. Fund L.
Ass'n (1899) 173 Mass. 197, 53 N. E. 398 (application through local agent
and delivery and payment of premium); Coscarella v. Metropolitan L. Ins.
Co. (1913) 175 Mo. App. 130, 157 S. W. 873 (insurance contract negotiated,
premiums paid and the policy delivered); Schuler v. Metropolitan L. Ins.
Co. (1915) 191 Mo. App. 52, 176 S. W. 274 (contract negotiated, delivered
and premiums collected in state); O'Maley v. Northwestern Mut. L. Ins.
Co. (Mo. App. 1936) 95 S. W. (2d) 852, cert. den. (1936) 299 U. S. 585
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the premium is common. Or the court may simply purport to
apply the place of making rule without discussing the important
factors which connect the policy with the state whose law is
chosen.30 And courts have relied upon statutes making a solicitor
the agent of the insurer,31 or providing that all contracts of in-
surance for which application is taken within the state (or upon
lives within the state)32 shall be taken as made within the state,
as necessarily determining the place of making of the contract.
More particularly, when terms in the policy postpone effective
operation of the contract until it has been delivered by an agent
to the insured while the latter is in good health, there is little
difficulty in finding that manual transfer of the instrument is
the effective act as to both time and place elements.33 Or where
there is payment in advance to accompany the application and
a binder receipt is issued, there is frequently a provision that the
policy is to be effective as of the date of the application, if it is
approved by the insurer's home-office. In some of these cases
it has been held that the place of making is where the applica-
tion is filled out and the premium is paid ;34 in others it has been
held that it occurs at the time and place of approval by the home-
office officials. 35 A provision that the policy should be effective
(on application with provision for delivery in the state, and the policy is
so delivered, it is a contract of that state); Metropolitan L. Ins. Co. v.
Lodzinski (1937) 122 N. J. Eq. 404, 194 At. 79 modifying (1936) 121 N. J.
Eq. 188, 188 Atl. 681 (applied for, issued and delivered); New York L.
Ins. Co. v. Block (1893) 6 Ohio Cir. Ct. Dec. 166 (delivery and payment
of premiums); Atlas L. Ins. Co. v. Standfier (Tex. Civ. App. 1935) 86
S. W. (2d) 852 (application provided policy did not become binding until
actual delivery and upon payment of the premium).
80. Stipcich v. Metropolitan L. Ins. Co. (1928) 277 U. S. 311, reversing
(D. C. D. Oregon 1925) 8 F. (2d) 285; Royal Union Mut. L. Ins. Co. v.
Wynn (C. C. N. D. Ga. 1910) 177 Fed. 289; Mutual L. Ins. Co. of N. Y. v.
Hilton-Green (C. C. A. 5th 1913) 202 Fed. 113; Eichwedel v. Metropolitan
L. Ins. Co. (1925) 216 Mo. App. 452, 270 S. W. 415; Connecticut Gen. L.
Ins. Co. v. Skurkay (1933) 204 N. C. 227, 167 S. E. 802.
81. Continental L. Ins. Co. v. Chamberlain (1889) 132 U. S. 304; Bank
Say. L. Ins. Co. v. Butler (C. C. A. 8th 1930) 38 F. (2d) 972.
82. State L. Ins. Co. v. Westcott (1910) 166 Ala. 192, 52 So. 344; Fidelity
Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. Miazza (1908) 93 Miss. 18, 46 So. 817, 136 Am. St.
Rep. 534.
83. Limbaugh v. Monarch L. Ins. Co. (Mo. App. 1935) 84 S. W. (2d) 208.
34. Keenan v. John Hancock Mut. L. Ins. Co. (1929) 50 R. I. 158, 146 Atl.
401; Atlas L. Ins. Co. v. Standfier (Tex. Civ. App. 1935) 86 S. W. (2d) 852.
35. Metropolitan L. Ins. Co. v. Cohen (C. C. A. 2d 1938) 96 F. (2d) 66.
This case, which failed to apply the law of the state in which the applica-
tion was made and the premiums were paid, and which denied recovery by
applying the law of the state of the insurer's home-office, is partially ex-
plainable upon the basis that the court there over-looked the fact that a
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from 12 o'clock noon standard time at the place where the in-
sured resided was considered highly persuasive that the parties
intended the place of effectiveness of the contract to be the resi-
dence of the insured. 6 If the court interprets an application as
calling for a promise to insure, which requires communication
of its acceptance, then it has been held not sufficient communi-
cation to send information to the soliciting agent through whom
the original application had been placed; the result has been to
work out the last necessary act at the place of actual notification,
the place from which the application was sent.37 So, also, if the
application is construed to require actual approval and accep-
tance of the policy by the insured, 8 or if his written acceptance
of the policy is contemplated, 39 the contract is formed at the place
where that act occurs. If the application is not accepted and the
insurance company issues a policy variant from that contem-
plated by the applicant-as by a change in plan or amount of
insurance or by rating-this will constitute a counter-offer, and
acceptance must be by the act, and at the place, of the insured. 40
But if the place of making rule is relied on to impose liability,
the complaint must allege facts showing the place of making.
41
Countersignature by an agent of the company, while now an un-
usual provision in a standard life policy, may occasionally be-
come a persuasive factor in determining the place of delivery
binding receipt had been given for the premium. This factor, which might
well have been held to connect the contract with the place where the policy
was physically received, is an important one. The court emphasized that
the contract came into being upon approval by insurance officials, as pro-
vided for in the application, and that this constituted the last act essential
to a "meeting of the minds of the parties."
36. Limbaugh v. Monarch L. Ins. Co. (Mo. App. 1935) 84 S. W. (2d)
208.
37. Ibid.
38. Provident Say. L. Assur. Soc. v. Hadley (C. C. A. 1st 1900) 102 Fed.
856, affirming (1898) 90 Fed. 390.
39. Coverdale v. Royal Arcanum (1901) 193 Ill. 91, 61 N. E. 915.
40. Carrollton Furniture Mfg. Co. v. American Credit Indem. Co. (C. C.
A. 2d 1903) 124 Fed. 25; the case involved credit insurance but the court
applied a misrepresentation statute relating to "an application for, or policy
of, insurance."
41. Allegations that the defendant is a Pennsylvania corporation duly
authorized and licensed to transact business in New York, that a policy
was executed at its home-office, and that it insured a certain life for a
sum paid in advance on the delivery of its policy of insurance, held demur-
rable in a suit in New York for failure to show that the delivery occurred
in New York to make its law of misrepresentations and warranties avail-
able. Mees v. Pittsburgh L. & T. Co. (1915) 169 App. Div. 86, 154 N. Y. S.
660.
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for a policy of health and accident insurance.42 Occasionally a
court will find a number of factors concurring in pointing to a
particular state as the place of making of the contract and the
case may be disposed of without detailed consideration of them.43
In most of the warranty and representation cases which em-
ploy the place of making test, some basis is given in the opinion
for ascertaining the state in which the court found the last neces-
sary act to have occurred; there are some cases, however, which
do not indicate this factor and in them resort appears to be had
to the internal rule of the forum with the result that the insured
recovered.44 This may reflect the tendency of some courts to dis-
regard possible conflict of laws features of a case and to decide
it upon strictly internal law rules, based only upon an inference
that the forum was the place of making of the contract in ques-
tion.
In a few cases where it appeared that the contract was not
entered into within the forum and the court applied the place of
making rule, the decision was favorable to the claimant. 45 On
the other hand, the insurance company prevailed in the majority
of warranty cases in which the forum applied the rule of another
state as the place where the policy came into the physical control
42. Pacific Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. Hale (Tex. Civ. App. 1924) 267 S. W.
282; Miller v. Maryland Cas. Co. (C. C. A. 3d 1912) 193 Fed. 343.
43. Limbaugh v. Monarch L. Ins. Co. (Mo. App. 1935) 84 S. W. (2d) 208.
44. Reagan v. Union Mut. L. Ins. Co. (1910) 207 Mass. 79, 92 N. E.
1025 (the place of making was stated to be either Maine or Massachusetts,
with similar result); Keatley v. Travelers' Ins. Co. (1898) 187 Pa. 197, 40
AtI. 808 (neither the place of making nor the residence of the insured was
stated); Moak v. Continental Cas. Co. (1927) 4 Tenn. App. 287 (disability
insurance--place of making indicated but forum comes close ta applying
an internal law rule). See also Chamberlain v. National L. & Accid. Ins.
Co. (1934) 256 Ky. 548, 76 S. W. (2d) 628 (here the insurer prevailed).
45. Rauen v. Prudential L. Ins. Co. (1906) 129 Iowa 725, 106 N. W. 198;
Leonard v. State Mut. L. Assur. Co. (1905) 27 R. I. 121, 61 Atl. 52, 114
Am. St. Rep. 30 (case remanded for further trial on issues, thus offering
advantage to claimant); Fishbeck v. New York L. Ins. Co. (1923) 179 Wis.
869, 192 N. W. 170.
46. New York L. Ins. Co. v. Malloy (D. C. N. H. 1938) 21 F. Supp.
1001; New York L. Ins. Co. v. Rigas (1933) 117 Conn. 437, 168 Atl. 22;
Chamberlain v. National L. & Accid. Ins. Co. (1934) 256 Ky. 548, 76 S. W.
(2d) 628; Lewis v. New York L. Ins. Co. (1919) 201 Mo. App. 48, 209
S. W. 625; Prentiss v. Illinois L. Ins. Co. (Mo. 1920) 225 S. W. 695; Mutual
L. Ins. Co. of N. Y. v. Wiegmann (1923) 214 Mo. App. 54, 256 S. W, 505;
Eichwedel v. Metropolitan L. Ins. Co. (1925) 216 Mo. App. 452, 270 S. W.
415; Connecticut General L. Ins. Co. v. Skurkay (1933) 204 N. C. 227, 167
S. E. 802; Pacific Mut. L. Ins. Co. of California v. Hale (Tex. Civ. App.
1924) 267 S. W. 282.
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of the applicant. An examination of the facts of these cases
shows that contacts with the forum were very slight and hardly
justify resort to its internal rule in a conflict of laws case.47 But
while the relatively small number of cases on the latter point
makes comparison inconclusive, the decisions do suggest several
considerations.
In these instances the facts were such that the denial of lia-
bility would be agreed to by most impartial observers; perhaps
the misrepresentations appear particularly flagrant. But it must
be recognized that neither courts nor juries have taken an en-
tirely impartial attitude in respect to the strict doctrine of war-
ranties. There is at least an equal number of instances, appear-
ing equally flagrant, in which recovery has been permitted by
courts and juries in a forum which was also the place of making
of the contract. That suggests the possibility that both courts
and juries may be more- astute to find bases for recovery when
the insured was a resident of the forum at the time of inception
of the insurance relationship than in cases where the contract was
entered into elsewhere. There is the further possibility, which
is not always negatived by the opinions, that the common law
or .statutory modification of the strict warranty doctrine obtain-
ing at the place of making of the contract was less favorable to
47. It is clear that there are limits upon the extent to which a forum
court may go in failing to apply a rule of law of a sister-state, when
dominant contacts are entirely connected with the latter place; considera-
tions of due process of law and full faith and credit to state statutes are
significant but are beyond the scope of this article. See Hilpert & Cooley,
The Federal Constitution and the Choice of Law (1939) 25 WASHINGTON
U. LAW QUARTERLY 27; Smith, The Constitution and the Conflict of Laws
(1939) 27 Geo. L. J. 536; Abel, Administrative Determinations and Full
Faith and Credit (1937) 22 Ia. L. Rev. 461; Ross, "Full Faith and Credit"
in a Federal System (1936) 20 Minn. L. Rev. 140; Corwin, The "Full Faith
and Credit" Clause (1933) 81 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 371; Ross, Has the Conflict
of Laws Become a Branch of Constitutional Law? (1931) 15 Minn. L. Rev.
161; Langmaid, The Full Faith and Credit Required for Public Acts (1929)
24 Ill. L. Rev. 383; Field, Judicial Notice of Public Acts under the Full
Faith and Credit Clause (1928) 12 Minn. L. Rev. 439; Dodd, The Power
of the Supreme Court to Review State Decisions in the Field of Conflict of
Laws (1926) 39 Harv. L. Rev. 533; Cook, The Powers of Congress under
the Full Faith and Credit Clause (1919) 28 Yale L. J. 421; Schofield, Full
Faith and Credit vs. Comity and Local Rules of Jurisdiction and Decision
(1915) 10 Ill. L. Rev. 11; Costigan, The History of the Adoption of Section
I of Article IV of the United States Constitution and a Consideration of
the Effect of Judgments of that Section and of Federal Legislation (1904)
4 Colum. L. Rev. 470. The two most recent pronouncements regarding these
clauses are Griffin v. McCoach (1941) 61 S. Ct. 1023, and Klaxon Co. v.
Stentor Electric Mfg. Co. (1941) 61 S. Ct. 1020.
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the claimant than corresponding rules in the state where suit
was brought. If the home-state of the insured was not favorable
to him, a claimant can hardly expect the forum, having no other
relationship with the facts, to be more sympathetic. Yet the
possibility of the forum court's applying concepts other than the
place of making in order to ground recovery, when it was the
state in which delivery and payment of the premium occurred, is
not unknown. The following subdivisions consider some of those
situations.
2. Employment of the place of performance rule.
Several cases dealing with representations and warranties have
stressed the importance of the place of performance. In Seiders
v. Merchants' Life AssociationB the insurance company had its
home-office at St. Louis, Missouri, but it was doing business in
Texas where application was made to its local agent, the medical
examination was conducted, and where the preliminary papers
were forwarded to the home-office. The company issued a policy
and mailed it to the agent in Texas for transmission to the ap-
plicant. The contract recited: "The Merchants' Life Associa-
tion * * * does promise to pay to Mary Seiders, wife of the in-
sured, at the home-office of the association in the city of St.
Louis * * * within thirty days after receipt and approval by it
of satisfactory proofs of the death of Pinkey W. Seiders, Austin,
Texas." It may be observed that there were ample contacts upon
which it might be held that Texas was the place of making of
the contract; and the quoted provision regarding the place of
payment is merely a customary one in life policies.
The company defended upon the ground of misrepresentations
regarding prior rejections by other insurance companies and of
the drinking habits of the insured. There was judgment below
in favor of the company which contended that the contract of
insurance was made in Texas and was to be governed by its laws.
The beneficiary sought reversal upon the ground that, although
the contract was made in Texas, it must be interpreted by the
laws of Missouri since it was to be performed in that state;
Missouri laws included a misrepresentation statute more liberal
than that obtaining in Texas. The court agreed with the bene-
48. (1900) 93 Tex. 194, 54 S. W. 753 reversing (Tex. Civ. App. 1899) 51
S. W. 547.
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ficiary's contention and held that the lower court erred in not
entering judgment for the plaintiff below in conformity with
provisions of the Missouri statute because the matter misrepre-
sented did not contribute to the death. The court stated :4
Conceding that the contract of insurance was made in
Texas, it is made payable at the home office in the State of
Missouri, and all premiums are likewise made payable there.
It does not provide for any act to be done elsewhere by the
company. A tender of the money at the home office would
have been valid. Unless there is something in the circum-
stances which indicate that the parties contracted with refer-
ence to the laws of Texas, the legal effect of the contract
must be determined according to the laws of the State of
Missouri. * * *
It is a well established rule of construction applied to this
character of contracts that courts will construe them so as
to prevent a forfeiture of the rights of the insured, if it can
be done consistently with the terms of the policy and the law,
and in case of doubt, the contract will be construed most
strongly against the insurance company. Under this rule,
the court would, if there were doubt upon the subject, pre-
sume that the contract was made with reference to the laws
of the State of Missouri, by which the rights of the insured
would be protected. The terms of the policy which are in-
voked to prevent a recovery are harsh, demanding "the
pound of flesh," because of misrepresentations which caused
no injury and are not entitled to enforcement except in
obedience to the mandate of the law. Under the statute of
the State of Missouri, the representation made by P. W.
Seiders, although false, did not have the effect to avoid the
policy, because the matter misrepresented did not contribute
to his death, * * *.
This quotation shows clearly that employment of the place of
performance test was for the purpose of protecting the bene-
ficiary in what the court felt was a deserving case. One diffi-
culty with the place of performance test lies in the fact that the
performances by the parties to the contract may be of various
kinds and may occur at various places; and question arises
whether it is desirable to relate the effect of misrepresentations
and warranties, which do not concern the manner or mode of
performance, to the law of the place of performance instead of
to the place of making of the contract which was, in this case
49. Seiders v. Merchants' Life Ass'n (1900) 93 Tex. 194, 198-199, 200-
201, 54 S. W. 753, 754, 755.
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at least, clear. The Texas court had no hesitation in so doing,
but employment of the place of performance rule for this pur-
pose has been criticized.5°
A liberal misrepresentation statute obtaining in the state of
the insurer's incorporation was also applied in an Arkansas case,
Franklin Life Insurance Company v. Galligan,51 which relied
upon the rule of the place of performance. The residence of the
insured at the time the policy was taken out was not indicated
by the court but it may be inferred to have been in Arkansas;
application was made for insurance with a Missouri corporation,
which issued a policy "signed by its president and secretary, and
the corporate seal was affixed, at St. Louis, Mo." It was stipu-
lated therein that premiums should be paid at the home-office,
unless otherwise authorized by the insurer's receipt; and, upon
death of the insured, it was agreed that payment would be made
to the beneficiary at the home-office of the company. In applying
the Missouri statute, which was favorable to the beneficiary, the
court stated :52
The proof justified the conclusion that the company tak-
ing the insurance was a Missouri corporation; that the con-
tract of insurance was a Missouri contract, to be performed
in Missouri. Therefore the laws of Missouri governed in its
enforcement. * * * Since the law of Missouri governs, the
only question is, did the matters alleged to have been mis-
represented contribute to the death of the assured. This
question was properly submitted to the jury and their ver-
dict should stand.
In Bottomley v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Company s it
appeared that insurance had been taken out by a resident of
Rhode Island with a New York carrier. The policy was allowed
to lapse and was revived by the beneficiary who lived in Massa-
chusetts where suit was later brought. The company relied upon
misrepresentations of the beneficiary in effectuating the revival.
The Massachusetts court adopted the rule of the place of per-
formance and stated :54
50. See 2 Beale, Treatise on the Conflict of Laws (1935) §332.3, pp.
1086 et seq.
51. (1903) 71 Ark. 295, 73 S. W. 102, 100 Am. St. Rep. 73.
52. Franklin L. Ins. Co. v. Galigan (1903) 71 Ark. 295, 300, 73 S. W.
102, 104.
53. (1898) 170 Mass. 274, 49 N. E. 438.
54. Bottomley v. Metropolitan L. Ins. Co. (1898) 170 Mass. 274, 277,
49 N. E. 438, 489.
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Not only was the assured a resident of Rhode Island, but
the probable place of performance was also there. Certainly
it was so at the outset, * * * The place of performance will
ordinarily be deemed to be the place of a contract, unless the
parties intend otherwise.
It is possible that the policy in the Rottomley case may have
been silent upon the place of payment of benefits, and thus have
been distinguishable from that in the Seiders case, but the court
did not refer to language of the contract. Without indicating the
law of New York, the court applied the law of Rhode Island,
where the contract was originally made, to govern the effect of
misrepresentations occurring in Massachusetts by which that
contract was revived. It is possible that revival in Massachusetts
constituted a new contract and the court could have determined
whether misrepresentations in effecting it were to be governed
'by the law of Massachusetts or of New York. In ignoring this
possibility and treating the point in issue as determined by the
law of Rhode Island, it is apparent that the Massachusetts court
adopted a different view of the operation of the place of per-
formance rule from that taken in the Seiders and Galligan cases.
The latter decisions relied upon provisions in the policies to relate
performance to the places of the insurers' home-offices; the Mas-
sachusetts court in the Bottomley case did not consider language
in the policy, and presumed that the place of performance was
the same as the place of making of the contract of insurance.
While only a few cases have been found employing the place
of performance rule in relation to problems of warranties and
representations, the use of this device is rather common in cer-
tain other types of insurance problems. But the courts of none
of the states applying this rule would have been impelled to adopt
or to follow it had the rules, from which choice was to be made,
been reversed, with the more liberal rule obtaining at the place
where the contract was made. The performance rule is gener-
ally used to point to the law of the insurer's home-state and, to
this extent, is available as an alternative rule which a forum may
employ when confronted with facts creating sympathy for the
beneficiary; the Seiders and Galligan cases illustrate the possi-
bility. In those cases the conflict of laws citations given by the
courts in support of the chosen rule are in the general field of
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contracts-not insurance cases-and particularly cases involving
usury as to which there is the greatest flexibility."
Not only is there the greatest lack of uniformity in the deci-
sions by various courts regarding choice-of-laws rules applicable
to contracts, but the Supreme Court of the United States for-
merly following federal common law rules has, at one time or
another, followed every possible rule in determining the validity
and construction of contracts in the conflict of laws.56 Since the
forum in the cases presented in this subdivision had important
connection with operative facts, there seems no reason to believe
that application of the rule of the place of performance would
be held by the Supreme Court of the United States to be an un-
constitutional exercise of power.
8. The rue intended by the parties to govern the contract.
The rule that a contract will be governed by the law of the
place with reference to which it was made is one expression of
the so-called intention test as a choice-of-laws rule governing
contracts. The rule is a flexible one since a court may find an
intention to contract under the law of either the place of con-
tracting or the place of performance as it feels was contemplated
by the parties. In problems of warranties and representations
the question has been whether a court would apply the intention
test to effectuate an express provision in the policy that it was
made in the state of the insurer's home-office or that it was to
be governed by the law of that place. Several considerations bear
upon judicial application of the intention rule to effectuate such
provisions.
A substantial number of states have enacted statutes seeking
to link the life insurance contract with local law. This legisla-
55. See, e. g., the cases cited in Seiders v. Merchants' L. Ass'n (1900)
98 Tex. 194, 199, 54 S. W. 758, 754.
56. See, e. g., as illustrative of the various rules followed, *although not
life insurance cases: (law of domicil) Union Trust Co. v. Grosman (1918)
245 U. S. 412; (law of place of making) Scudder v. Union National Bank
(1875) 91 U. S. 406; (law of place of making or of performance?) Hall v.
Cordell (1891) 142 U. S. 116; (law intended by parties) Liverpool & G. W.
Steam Co. v. Phenix Ins. Co. (1889) 129 U. S. 397; (law intended by the
parties or of place where consideration was given?) Pritchard v. Norton
(1882) 106 U. S. 124; (usury-law of place of making) Andrews v. Pond
(U. S. 1839) 13 Pet. 65; (usury-law of place of performance) Miller v.
Tiffany (U. S. 1863) 1 Wall. 298; (performance-currency valuation of
place of breach of contract) Deutsche Bank Filiale Nurnberg v. Humphrey
(1926) 272 U. S. 517.
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tion has taken various forms. Statutes exist providing that all
contracts of insurance, the application for which is taken within
the state, shall be deemed to have been made within the state,
and subject to the laws thereof; or, no insurance company doing
business within the state shall make, issue or deliver therein any
policy containing any condition, stipulation or agreement requir-
ing such contract to be construed according to the laws of any
other state; or, no company or agent shall issue or deliver in this
state any policy which conflicts with any provision of this statute.
Although present practice is entirely different, it was formerly
quite common to insert a clause in a life policy that it be held
made under, or construed solely by, the laws of the state of in-
corporation of the insurer. While the exact date at which gen-
eral change was made in policy forms on this point is unknown,
it was relatively recent and it is possible that additional cases
may yet arise based upon policies containing that clause. These
provisions do not seem to have been included in policies issued
within the last few years 57 and, since the incontestability clause
bars defenses based upon warranties and misrepresentations
within a short period, it is unlikely that new cases involving
misstatements will raise questions whether courts will effectuate
an express provision that the contract is to be governed by rules
obtaining in the insurer's home-state. There may, however, be
presented other problems turning around this type of policy pro-
vision, and the technique developed in dealing with the clause
in warranty cases may carry over into other phases of insur-
ance law.
There are two lines of authorities dealing with this type of
provision in conflict of laws cases relating to warranties and
representations. In one group of decisions the courts have in-
voked the intention rule to effectuate the stipulation of govern-
ing law contained in the policy. In the other group the courts
have struck down the clause. As was pointed out above, the latter
line of decisions may be taken as application of the place of
making rule, but it has seemed advisable to treat the two groups
of cases in conjunction with each other in order to contrast the
attitude of courts in dealing with the same policy provisions.
57. The writer has been informed that the Insurance Commissioners of
at least two states have required that each policy delivered to a resident
of the state contain a clause that the contract is made under and is to be
construed by the law of that state.
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In a number of instances courts have been quite willing to
effectuate an intention of the parties disclosed by a policy pro-
vision that the law of the insurer's home-state be applied, and
these courts have so ruled although the forum was the place
where the insured had applied for and received the policy. In
these instances, however, the specified law operated more favor-
ably toward the claimant than would the law of the place of
making which, as has been shown, has more usually been em-
ployed.
Thus, in Missouri State Life Insurance Company v. Lovelace,58
suit was brought in Georgia upon a policy issued by a Missouri
corporation. The residence of the insured and the place of mak-
ing were not specified in the opinion but it may be inferred that
both were in Georgia; the court did not indicate the Georgia
internal law rule but it was less favorable to the insured. The
policy stipulated: "This contract shall be governed by and con-
strued according to the laws of Missouri; the place of this con-
tract being expressly agreed to be the home-office of the com-
pany." The court stated that parties are presumed to contract
with reference to the lex locus contractus but, where the contract
is made in one state and is to be performed in another, the law
of the latter place will be applied insofar as it does not conflict
with rules of policy of the forum. Several defenses were ad-
vanced: suicide, misrepresentations as to drinking habits, the
necessity of attaching a copy of the application to the policy, sub-
mission to the jury of materiality of misrepresentations, and
nonpayment of premiums. All were held governed by Missouri
statutes, and another Missouri statute imposing penalities and
attorney fees was likewise applied although Georgia had a simi-
lar statute. The position was summarized by the statement that
the trial court in Georgia was like a Missouri court--"For this
case pro hac vice-it is our own law."
While such deference to the specified foreign law is most un-
usual, it will be noticed that judgment against the company was
facilitated by the exercise of this device; the emphasis upon Mis-
souri law-to which the court returned again and again-would
hardly have been necessary had the Georgia law been favorable
to the insured.59
58. (1907) 1 Ga. App. 446, 58 S. E. 93.
59. In Massachusetts Ben. L. Ass'n. v. Robison (1898) 104 Ga. 256,
30 S. E. 918, 42 L. R. A. 261, the policy contained a clause that the place
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In Fidelity Mutual Life Association v. Haris', there is state-
ment of a similar rule but, due to the fact that the court did not
clearly analyze the factor of the place of making and since the
misrepresentation was ultimately held material under either pos-
sible rule, the exact meaning of the case is obscure. The policy
in question was applied for in Texas through an itinerant agent
representing a Pennsylvania corporation; the premium accom-
panied the application which was forwarded to the home-office,
and a policy was issued reciting that it became "effective upon
delivery to the insured in good health and payment of the
premium." Reference has been made to frequent reliance upon
factors of delivery and payment of the premium to connect a
contract with local law. The company brought a bill to cancel
the policy upon the ground that the insured was suffering from
tuberculosis, although it was not shown that he was aware of
the fact at the time of application. The insured died pendente
lite and cross-action upon the policy was instituted by his admin-
istrator. The court first considered the law applicable and
adopted the rule of the law intended by the parties, concluding
that they intended Pennsylvania law to govern, The court then
stressed the facts that the premium accompanied the application,
and absolute delivery (except for the question of good health)
occurred in Pennsylvania; the latter state was said to be the
place of making of the contract. It is possible that the court was
influenced by the fact that payment of the premium had been
made in advance, and that the case is also evidence of a tendency
by some courts to treat the place of the insurer's home-office as
governing in the binding receipt cases.
The court's reference to the law of the insurer's home-state
of the contract was in the city of Boston, and that the policy was to be
governed and construed only according to the laws of the state of Massa-
chusetts. The court stated: " * * * it is true that under the statement
in the policy the contract becomes a Massachusetts contract, and is to be
dealt with in the same manner as if it had been executed in that state"--
and then (the laws of Massachusetts not having been pleaded) the court
held that it was unnecessary to inquire into Massachusetts law, the matter
of misrepresentation being properly submitted to the jury under the Georgia
rule of procedure. The same approach was taken in John Hancock Mut.
L. Ins. Co. v. Yates (1936) 182 Ga. 213, 185 S. E. 268, affirming (1935)
50 Ga. App. 713, 179 S. E. 239, where the sister-state law was pleaded;
the decision in the state court was reversed by the Supreme Court of the
United States under the full faith and credit clause in (1936) 299 U. S.
178.
60. (1900) 94 Tex. 25, 57 S. W. 635, 86 Am. St. Rep. 813.
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is similar to the result in the Lovelace case, since it appeared
that in Texas the strict rules on warranties then obtained while
Pennsylvania had a statute requiring that a misrepresentation
must be material in order to avoid the policy. It was found, how-
ever, that the misrepresentation was in fact material. In these
circumstances it appears questionable whether the Pennsylvania
law would have been taken as applicable had Texas followed a
rule as liberal as that of Missouri in the Lovelace case and had
Pennsylvania adhered to the common law doctrine of warranties.
In the well-known case of Penn Mvtual Life Insurance Com-
pany v. Mechanics' Savings Bank & Trust Company61 it was
held that a life insurance policy issued upon an application which
expressly provided that the contract was to be taken as made
at the home-office of the company was to be governed by the laws
of that state, although the insured was a resident of a different
state at the time of making of the application; a liberal statute
obtaining in the insurer's home-state was applied.
Effect was also given to the law specified in the policy, which
was favorable to the claimant, in a decision by the Virginia
court.
62
On the other hand, based upon considerations indicated above,
when construction of a policy containing an express provision
for governing law has come before a court of the state where
the contract was made, and where the laws were more favorable
to the claimant, the result has been to strike down the provision
as invalid. The basis for this consequence is clearly indicated
in the language of the Maryland court, per Worthington, J. :13
* * * we deem it against public policy to permit a contract
of insurance made here since the passage of the Act of 1894
with a citizen of this State, to be governed by the harsh
rules of the common law which by legal presumption merely,
is supposed to obtain in the State of New York by whose
laws it is sought to have this contract construed.
When a corporation undertakes to do business beyond the
territorial limits of the State creating it, it does so merely
by comity, and the State which it enters for the purpose of
61. (C. C. A. 6th 1896) 72 Fed. 413.
62. Union Central L. Ins. Co. v. Pollard (1896) 94 Va. 146, 26 S. E. 421,
36 L. R. A. 271, 64 Am. St. Rep. 715.
63. Mutual L. Ins. Co. v. Mullan (1908) 107 Md. 457, 462-463, 69 Atl.
385, 387. It may be noted, however, that the misrepresentations were held
material, even under the more favorable rule of the place of making.
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transacting business therein, has the power to require such
corporation to carry on its business there subject to its stat-
utes, and this Court will not allow the parties to such con-
tracts as this, by any stipulations contained therein to con-
travene the salutary provisions of this statute intended for
the protection of our own citizens against common law war-
ranties.
In a Pennsylvania case, Keatley v. Travelers' Insurance Cor-
pany of Hartford, Conn.,64 the contract stated: "This policy shall
be held as of Connecticut issue and construed solely by Connecti-
cut law." The court held that the purpose of the statute of Penn-
sylvania-the place of making-was to strike down "literal war-
ranties, so far as they may be resorted to for the disreputable
purpose of enforcing actually immaterial matters * * *. It would
be contrary to public policy to recognize the right of parties to
circumvent the law by setting up a waiver such as is insisted
on in this case." 65
Similar applications of the rule are found in a number of
decisions of state courts 8 involving representations and war-
ranties and also in decisions by federal courts 7 purporting to
apply the rule of the place of making. It will be noted that in
each of these cases the law of the place of making was more
favorable to the insured than the law specified in the contract,
and also that in each instance the case came before a court in
the state where the contract was found to be made, or before
64. (1898) 187 Pa. 197, 40 Atl. 808.
65. Three months before the application, insured had had an attack which
several physicians stated was apoplexy, paresis or partial paralysis; the
patient recovered in two or three weeks and physicians then said it was
improbable that he could have had either paresis or apoplexy. He had been
a drinker but claimed to have stopped; one doctor had told him if he did
not stop drinking he would die. The materiality of these facts was held
for the jury. The cause of death is not shown in the report.
66. State L. Ins. Co. v. Westcott (1910) 166 Ala. 192, 52 So. 344; Dolan
v. Mutual Res. Fund L. Assoc. (1899) 173 Mass. 197, 53 N. E. 398; Har-
wood v. Security Mut. L. Ins. Co. (1928) 263 Mass. 341, 161 N. E. 589;
Fidelity Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. Miazza (1908) 93 Miss. 18, 46 So. 817, 136
Am. St. Rep. 534 (but of. Fleming v. Grimes (1926) 142 Miss. 522, 107
So. 420, 422, 45 A. L. R. 618, where the court stated: "The policy here
involved is a New York contract and the decisions of that state are perti-
nent") ; New York L. Ins. Co. v. Block (1893) 6 Ohio Cir. Ct. Dec. 166.
67. Fletcher v. New York L. Ins. Co. (C. C. E. D. Mo. 1882) 13 Fed.
526; New York L. Ins. Co. v. Russell (C. C. A. 8th 1896) 77 Fed. 94;
Mutual Ben. L. Ins. Co. v. Robison (C. C. N. D. Iowa E. D. 1893) 54 Fed.
580, affirmed (C. C. A. 8th 1893) 58 Fed. 723; Great Southern L. Ins. Co. v.
Burwell (C. C. A. 5th 1926) 12 F. (2d) 244, cert. den. (1926) 271 U. S.
683.
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a federal court sitting in that district. These cases striking
down a provision for governing law, inserted by draftsmen in
the hope that courts would effectuate an expressed intention of
the parties, constitute another manifestation of the general rule
that courts will protect residents of the forum in their dealings
with foreign insurance companies. In these instances the courts
were apparently well aware of the fact that insurance contracts
are sold and not bought, that they do not result from equal bar-
gaining, and that the applicant must merely "adhere" to the terms
of the contract tendered to him by the insurance company. It
is also worthy of note that in these instances, with two exceptions
in which the misrepresentations were held material even under
the rule obtaining at the place of makingr8 the decisions were
adverse to the insurer.
(To be concluded in the February number.)
68. Mutual L. Ins. Co. v. Mullan (1908) 107 Md. 457, 69 AtI. 385 and
Dolan v. Mutual Res. Fund L. Ass'n (1899) 173 Mass. 197, 53 N. E. 398.
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